On 9/10/2024 4:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-09-10 02:48:11 +0000, Richard Damon said:
>
>> On 9/9/24 9:14 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 9/7/2024 8:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 9/7/24 9:28 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the observer does not know enough to know its true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yet it remains stipulated to be true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth of the belief.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If the belief is about something real then its justification
>>>>>>>>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I don't think that is correct.
>>>>>>>>>> My left hand exists right now even if it is
>>>>>>>>>> a mere figment of my own imagination and five
>>>>>>>>>> minutes ago never existed.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
>>>>>>>>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
>>>>>>>>> example.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
>>>>>>>>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
>>>>>>>>>> By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
>>>>>>>>>> that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
>>>>>>>>>> the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
>>>>>>>>>> individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
>>>>>>>>>> individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
>>>>>>>>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
>>>>>>>>>> are not of types fitting together.
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
>>>>>>>>>> History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the
>>>>>>>>> knowledge
>>>>>>>>> whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
>>>>>>>>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
>>>>>>>>> another problem.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog
>>>>>>>> implementations
>>>>>>>> is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA
>>>>>>>> truth preserving operations) to Facts.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic
>>>>>>> propositions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness
>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>> be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a
>>>>>> logic
>>>>>> with that impossibility.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
>>>>> (a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
>>>>> (b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
>>>>> (c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
>>>>> by applying Rules to Facts in L.
>>>>>
>>>>> Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
>>>>> hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
>>>>> simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
>>>>> in the same formal system.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't
>>>> actually know what you are talking about.
>>>
>>> I am stipulating how those terms work in my
>>> adaptation of Prolog you freaking nitwit.
>>>
>>
>> Then you aren't talking "Prolog", which is a fairly defined language.
>
> Is and is not. There is the standard Prolog but the name Prolog was already
> in use before the first standard. There are many different variants that
> are not standard conforming but are calloe "Prolog" anyway.
>
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.
x = "this sentence is not true"
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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