On 2024-08-31 18:48:18 +0000, olcott said:
> *This is how I overturn the Tarski Undefinability theorem*
> An analytic expression of language is any expression of formal or
> natural language that can be proven true or false entirely on the basis
> of a connection to its semantic meaning in this same language.
>
> This connection must be through a sequence of truth preserving
> operations from expression x of language L to meaning M in L. A lack of
> such connection from x or ~x in L is construed as x is not a truth
> bearer in L.
>
> Tarski's Liar Paradox from page 248
> It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
> in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
> x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
> with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>
> Formalized as:
> x ∉ True if and only if p
> where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x
> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>
> *Formalized as Prolog*
> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
> LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog semantics "false" would also be a correct
response.
> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
> false.
To the extend Prolog formalizes anything, that only formalizes
the condept of self-reference. I does not say anything about
int.
> When formalized as Prolog unify_with_occurs_check()
> detects a cycle in the directed graph of the evaluation
> sequence proving the LP is not a truth bearer.
Prolog does not say anything about truth-bearers.
> The purpose of this work was to show that algorithmic
> undecidability is a misconception providing more details
> than Wittgenstein's rebuttal of Gödel.
Which it didn't show.
> https://www.liarparadox.org/Wittgenstein.pdf
--
Mikko
|
|